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AVERTING THE FLOOD .BY LESSENING
THE FLOW*
Henry J. Friendlyt
I am glad that an early act of your new dean, whom I have
long admired, was to invite me to Ithaca. For me this is a return of
the native. I was born and raised in Elmira, only a few miles from
here, and most of my high school friends attended Cornell. Although I perversely decided to journey to the banks of the Charles
River rather than join the parade to Cayuga's waters, I have
retained an affection for this beautiful part of the country. May I
add my assurance that, under Dean Cramton's leadership, this
school will attain even greater heights.
The dean already has provided such a feast in the lectures of
Chief Judge Haynsworth and Professors Rosenberg and Kurland
as to make my role as the last speaker exceedingly difficult. It
would be quite impossible in a paper of reasonable length both to
develop my own solutions for the crisis in the federal courts and to
comment in detail on what has been put before you by the
preceding lecturers. Any of you who want an ampler exposition of
my views will find it in a book, FederalJurisdiction:A General View, I
an expansion of the Carpentier lectures I delivered at the Columbia University Law School a year ago. I shall be obliged to refer to
this rather frequently in order to put flesh on proposals that I must
put forward here in rather barebones form.
I
PROPOSALS

OF THE FREUND COMMITTEE

AND OF

CHIEF JUDGE HAYNSWORTH

The title I have chosen affords a good clue to my approach to
the problems of the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court, which I believe are shared by the district courts although in
somewhat lesser degree. If a stream is in mounting flood, common
sense would dictate consideration of measures to divert a portion
* This Article is an expansion of a lecture delivered as part of the fifty-sixth Frank
Irvine Lecture Series at the Cornell Law School on November 2, 1973.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
I H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973) [hereinafter cited as
FRIENDLY].
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of the flow. I'believe that solutions lie in that direction, rather than
by placing primary reliance on what-and I mean no disrespect by
this-seems to me in considerable measure a reshuffling at the
appellate level.
I shall not spend much time on the National Court of Appeals
proposed by the committee chaired by Professor Freund 2 -more
accurately a National Court for the Screening of Appeals, since it
evidently was not expected to do much else. For one thing, the
proposal would not-indeed, was not intended to-alleviate the
problems of the courts of appeals with which I am deeply concerned. Beyond that, the proposal has been talked to death and, if
I may say so with deference, I hope literally as well as figuratively.
The mortal blows would seem to have been administered by
former Chief Justice Warren's address to the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York3 and Mr. Justice Brennan's statement to
the First Circuit Judicial Conference. 4 The salient points in both
these statements, which had been made earlier by knowledgeable
but less authoritative sources, 5 are that the screening function can
be properly performed only by the Justices themselves, with whatever staff assistance they wish, since they alone have the required
knowledge and "feel" of what is going on within the Court, and
also that performance of this function is desirable to keep them
fully informed about movements and developments in the courts
below. The Warren and Brennan papers add a convincing demonstration that the Freund Committee gave too much weight to
raw. data and that performance of the screening function in seasoned hands has not compromised the Court's discharge of its duty
to decide cases wisely and write opinions that are persuasive and
lucid. To be sure, we have not yet heard from all members of the
Court. But, particularly in view of what the former Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Brennan have recounted about their own experience, one would have to discount cries of distress concerning the
certiorari burden from recent arrivals, if such there should be.
2 STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

REPORT (1972).

' Burger & Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends
Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 'A.B.A.J. 724 (1973).
1 Brennan,JusticeBrennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal"FundamentallyUnnecessary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973). For a fuller version, see Brennan, The National
Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473 (1973). I am pleased to note that
Chief Judge Haynsworth shares my views on the moribund state of the proposal for a
National Court of Appeals.
' See Lewin, Helping the Court with Its Work, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 3, 1973, at
15-19. See also Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973).
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With the regret stemming from my respect and affection for
several members of this distinguished committee, I think the time
has come to agree that their highly motivated proposal was illconceived and to stop devoting to it any part of the finite amount
of time available for discussion of reform of the federal judicial
system.
Chief Judge Haynsworth has put forward a thoughtful proposal for a National Court of Criminal Appeals 6 having certiorari
jurisdiction over all federal criminal appeals 7 and all state criminal
appeals raising a federal question. The principal way in which this
would relieve the courts of appeals would be by decreasing the
volume of applications to the district courts for postconviction
relief by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and by state
prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and consequently of appeals
from decisions rendered thereon, through foreclosing all claims
that were or could have been presented to the National Court on
direct review. Judge Haynsworth has now added the review of all
decisions on claims of state and federal prisoners attacking prison
conditions. The details of this added proposal are not altogether
clear to me. In any event it is plain that Judge Haynsworth's chief
concern is to develop a better solution for the problem of collateral
attack. Agreeing that the present situation is unacceptable, I think
there are more direct and less complicated means for dealing with
this problem.
A minor step, aimed solely at the appeals problem, would be to
provide that appeals in such cases can be taken only when a
certificate of probable cause has been issued by the court of
appeals.8 However, a more fundamental change is demanded and
has been proposed. A bill, introduced by Senators Hruska and
Scott in the second session of the last Congress and reintroduced in
6 Haynsworth, A New Court To Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841
(1973).
7 I realize that in his American Bar Association paper Judge Haynsworth spoke of
federal question issues in convictions in the state and federal systems. Id. at 842. But almost
every question in a federal criminal case is a federal question. If Judge Haynsworth was
referring only to federal convictions raising a constitutionalquestion, he did not say so. I had
thought he did not mean to, since otherwise his framework would include no provision for
review of other decisions of federal courts of appeals in criminal cases, although this is surely
necessary, notably in cases involving the interpretation of federal criminal statutes or the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. His lecture seems somewhat less clear on this point.
8 There is now no requirement for such a certificate with respect to federal prisoners.
In the case of state prisoners, the certificate can be granted by the judge who rendered the
decision or by any circuit judge or justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1970). The change recommended in the text is proposed in the bill cited in the succeeding footnote.
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this one, 9 would limit collateral attack to cases where the claimed
constitutional violation was not and could not have been previously
raised and where the violation "is of a right which has as its
primary purpose the protection of the reliability of either the
factfinding process at the trial or the appellate process on appeal
from the judgment of conviction,"' 1 and "the petitioner shows that
a different result would probably have obtained if such constitutional violation had not occurred.""
In view of the interest which had been taken in this proposal
by Senator Ervin, Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Judiciary
on Constitutional Rights, I have no doubt that it would have
already been the subject of hearings in the present Congress but
for the fact that Senator Ervin has had other preoccupations. The
delay may well result in Congress having an even better bill to
consider. At its September 1973 meeting, the Judicial Conference
of the United States received a report of its Special Committee on
Habeas Corpus which criticized the Hruska-Scott bill on various
grounds and set out a number of alternatives. Some of the criticism
seems to me to be valid; I now think the Hruska-Scott bill may have
gone a bit too far in foreclosure, particularly when account is taken
of the unhappily low level of the assistance of counsel in many
cases. The Conference directed the Committee, which has the
valuable assistance of Professor Frank Remington, to prepare a bill
for consideration at the Conference's spring meeting, and I am
confident it will be a good one. There is thus every reason to think
that, at long last, collateral attack on criminal convictions is on the
way to solution by well-considered legislation addressed directly to
the problem, 2 and there will be no need to create a new court for
that purpose.
9 S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 3833, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The bill
represents months of work by the Department of Justice and the staff of the Senate
Judiciary Committee; it should not be confused with much too drastic bills earlier introduced.
10 S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This would enact the dissenting opinions in
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), of Mr. Justice Black (id. at 231) and of Mr.
Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart (id. at 242), as well as the concurring opinion in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973), of Mr. Justice Powell, joined by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and in spirit by Mr. Justice Blackmun (id. at 249), all
to the effect that collateral attack should not ordinarily be available for claims of illegal
search and seizure.
S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
12 In a lecture at the University of Chicago Law School, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on CriminalJudgments(38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970)), I noted the possibility of routing
"appeals from state criminal decisions, whether on direct or on collateral attack, to a federal
appellate tribunal--either the appropriate court of appeals or a newly created court" and
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Once the problem of collateral attack is thus solved, the main
benefit in Judge Haynsworth's proposal-apart from the recent
addition of complaints concerning prison treatment, most of which
do not seem to merit review by such an august tribunal-would be
in relieving the case load of the Supreme Court, whose criminal
jurisdiction would be limited to cases where the new court had
granted certiorari and rendered a decision on the merits or where
one or more of its judges had voted for certiorari. If, in fact, the
Supreme Court is not now overburdened, as several Justices
maintain, 1 3 no sufficient justification exists. Indeed, even if the
Court's burden is excessive or should become so, I would object to
creation of the new court on two principal grounds.
The first is that it would interpose a new layer in the hierarchy,
with consequent delay in the final disposition of those cases which
the court took on for decision, or where at least one judge voted to
do so. Presumably the new court would review many more criminal
cases than the Supreme Court now does 14 and would take almost as
long in deciding them. Yet all these cases would be candidates for
certiorari to the Supreme Court and, since the new court had
evidenced its view of their importance by its own grant of certiorari, it could hardly refuse a stay to an unsuccessful defendant
pending an application for Supreme Court review. This could
mean another four to six months, depending on the season, in
cases where the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and a year or
more in cases where it granted this. There would also be added,
although less, delay in the many cases where the new court had
denied certiorari over the votes of one or more judges. Regrettable
as delay is in any area, it is most serious in the enforcement of the
criminal law.
My second objection is that while I am not at all opposed to
specialized courts in principle, criminal law seems to me the last
precluding "federal habeas corpus as to issues for which that remedy is available" (id. at 166),
but inclined in favor of a more direct approach to the problem.
Although Judge Haynsworth may object to the approach of continued insistence on
exhaustion of state remedies, which I anticipate the Habeas Corpus Committee will follow
since the defendant remains in prison during the process, I think that, in view of the
exceedingly small percentage of success, this is vastly preferable to letting him stay out of
prison pending review by the National Court of Criminal Appeals. Moreover, the exhaustion
requirement has great independent value from the standpoint of federalism, as Judge
Haynsworth recognizes in his proposal to require this for complaints by state prisoners in
regard to treatment.
" Justices Brennan and Douglas and former Chief Justice Warren. See A. BICKEL, THE
CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 15-16 (Domestic Affairs Study No. 21, 1973).
14 This would surely be true if the new court were to serve the function with respect to
collateral attack that Judge Haynsworth envisioned.
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place for them. 15 The main arguments for specialized courts are
the need for expertise and for prompt and authoritative determination of the law so that people can formulate their conduct
accordingly. As will later appear, I find these arguments persuasive
in two fields of federal law-patents and federal taxation. Neither
argument applies to criminal law. Its concepts are readily within
reach of any competent lawyer, even though, as has been the case
with many federal judges, he has had little or no criminal practice.
Furthermore, criminals do not plan their activity with an eye fixed
on the Bill of Rights, the Federal Penal Code, or the rules of
evidence applicable in criminal trials. While conflicts on such matters should ultimately be resolved, as they now are, the earliest
possible resolution is not a matter of urgency. Moreover, I see
actual detriments in a specialized court of criminal appeals. It is too
likely to become dominated by hard-liners or soft-liners, more
likely the former. 1 6 Bad as this would be in any event, it would be
worse if the predominant mood of the new court differed from
that of the Supreme Court. We would then see the frequent
reversals that proved the undoing of the Commerce Court,' 7 in a
field of law which is of far greater interest to citizens and carries a
heavy emotional charge. Such confrontations could have an unhappy effect on the Supreme Court as well. When the Supreme
Court reversed the National Court of Criminal Appeals, doubtless
by a sharply divided vote and with vigorous dissents, there would
be no general agreement that the Supreme Court was right and the
National Court was wrong. It is one thing for the Supreme Court
to reverse the highest court of Arizona, although that produced
storm enough, and quite another for it to be frequently reversing a
National Court of Criminal Appeals. When we reflect on the waves
of protest that nearly engulfed the Court after some of its constitutional decisions in the criminal field in the late 1960's, we should
15Perhaps anticipating this criticism, Judge Haynsworth proposed in his lecture that
the new court should have the added job of hearing and determining, although without
finality, civil cases referred by the Supreme Court. Reserving my general observations on this
procedure for later discussion, I do not think the proposal meets the objection to a
specialized criminal court. For one thing, with all the work Judge Haynsworth would give it,
now including complaints on prison conditions, I do not see how the new court could accept
additional burdens. On the other side, a court that might spend 90% of its time on criminal
matters is scarcely the ideal tribunal to settle conflicts between circuits on, for example, the
interpretation of the Federal Power Act or the scope of the class action.
16 While the English Court of Criminal Appeals is a separate court, it does not have
separate judges.
17 See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 153-74
(1928).
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impose a heavy burden of proof on a proposal that would entail
the likelihood of confrontations with a prestigious National Court
of Criminal Appeals. With the problem of collateral attack curable
by direct means, Judge Haynsworth's proposal does not meet that
test.
II
THE WRITER'S

PROPOSALS

Before considering the proposals of Professors Rosenberg and
Carrington, I shall outline my own. The essentials are as follows:
A.

Repeal of the FELA and the Jones Act (insofar as it relates to
American vessels) and their replacement by the modern workmen's
compensation act
In his shotgun review of my lectures Mr. John P. Frank
thought it sufficient for condemnation to call this a proposal to
"[s]end the seamen's, railroad workers', and longshoremen's personal injury business somewhere else."' 8 The characterization is
true enough, but Mr. Frank did not stop to explain why railroad
workers, longshoremen, and, so far as practicable, seamen should
not be "sent" where all other American workers, including those in
the related occupations of driving trucks and buses and flying
airplanes, have been for years, namely, under woikmen's compensation. Longshoremen have also been there since 1927 so far as
concerns suits against their employers, 19 and the last Congress
expanded this to include actions for unseaworthiness against the
ship, while at the same time increasing the benefits. 20 To urge the
retention of personal injury and wrongful death actions based on
fault for railroad workers and seamen alone is sheer antiquarianism.
B.

Elimination of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction or, ifthat is not
politically feasible, adoption of the proposals of the American Law
Institute to end the anomaly whereby a jurisdiction intended to protect
out-of-statersfrom local prejudice can be invoked by a resident of the
state
As shown in my lectures, however the case with respect to
diversity jurisdiction may have stood when Professor Frankfurter,
18 Frank, Book Review, 59 A.B.A.J. 466 (1973).

19 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50
(1970).
20 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§
901-95 (Supp. 1972).
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as he then was, advocated its abolition while speaking at this law
school in 1928,21 the arguments for retaining it will not hold water
when the federal courts are overburdened with distinctively federal
business.2 2 While the Erie decision eliminated the evil of forum
shopping, it also stripped the federal courts of the power to "make
law" in diversity actions. And there are simply no respectable
arguments for permitting the jurisdiction to be invoked today by a
resident of the state where the federal court is held. Here again
Mr. Frank's contrary position 2 3 reflects Alexander Pope's "Whatever is, is right." At the very least, while awaiting the congressional
verdict on the larger issue, let us relieve the federal courts of
personal injury litigation and, I would now add, actions on insurance policies, here and now.

C. A harder look at the ever increasing use of the federal criminal
24

process

At every sitting of our court, we hear appeals in cases where a
crime has been committed both against a state and against the
United States but the federal interest is far too small to warrant
taking the time of federal judges from more urgent tasks.23 Such
concurrent jurisdiction also affords grave possibilities of injustice
due to the disparity between state and federal sentences, a problem
acutely posed in this state by the stiff narcotics law recently enacted
in New York.2 6 The hard look that these matters deserve should
further include the question whether we rely too much on criminal
sanctions rather than civil penalties to enforce federal regulatory
statutes.2 7 Apart from the issue of the propriety of criminal sanc21 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928).
22 See FRIENDLY 139-52. The Chief Justice has recently said that "[d]iversity jurisdiction

had some validity for the first hundred years of our history but has had none for at least a
generation." Burger, Report on the FederalJudicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126
(1973).
23See Frank, For MaintainingDiversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963); Frank, Book
Review, 59 A.B.A.J. 466 (1973).
24 See FRIENDLY 55-61. As there noted (id. at 61-62 n.25), I do not mean to slight the
larger question of decreasing both federal and state judicial business by eliminating various
"victimless" crimes from the penal code. That subject was simply too large for consideration
in lectures devoted to the special problems of the federal courts.
'5 We now have the new problem of the government's manufacturing the federal
elements. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.), on rehearing,486 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.
1973).
"I N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60, 220 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
27 See Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and PotentialUse of Civil Money Penalties as
a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 REcOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

there cited.

896, 916-19 (1973), and authorities
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tions in many such cases, Congress can provide that civil penalties
may be administratively imposed, with the function of the courts
limited to judicial review; in fact, because of the usually small
amount of each such penalty, there would be little inclination to
incur the expense required for review. The revision of the Federal
Penal Code, now pending before the Senate, affords a splendid
opportunity for reconsideration of the scope of federal criminal
jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the Attorney General could make a useful
contribution by promulgating guidelines for restraint in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction and requiring United States attorneys to observe them.
D. Reversal of the recent legislative trend whereby the executive branch
can seek immediate enforcement of regulatory statutes by the courts
28
without prior executive or administrativefact-finding
This would not decrease the number of actions but would
substantially diminish the judicial burden. I realize this is not a
popular position, since the executive and administrative agencies
have declined in favor while the courts have risen. But it is a
necessary one, and we now have an excellent but insufficiently
known agency, the Administrative Conference of the United States,
which your dean did much to strengthen, that should be consulted
far more often in the drafting of new regulatory statutes and the
revision of old ones. Indeed, Congress ought to make it a standard
practice to obtain the views of the Conference on procedural
matters before enacting any new regulatory legislation. Failing
action along the lines indicated, the district courts should make
fuller use of federal magistrates to hear and report on factual
issues in enforcement actions; since these are generally equitable in
nature, there seems to be no constitutional bar to doing this.
E. Provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare with funds, staff, presidential support, and statutory power adequate to enable them to discharge their
responsibilities to enforce the provision of equal treatment without the
29
necessity of resorting to the courts
This is important not simply, or even primarily, to relieve the
courts but because the judicial process is too slow and expensive for
litigants. The courts should be reserved for the cases where all else
has failed.
28
29

See FRIENDLY 62-68.
See id. at 76-87.
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F. Limit collateral attack on judgments of conviction
Here I need only refer to my previous discussion.30
G. Require state prisoners complaining under the Civil Rights Act with
respect to the conditions of their confinement to exhaust state administrative andjudicial remedies, if these are adequate and effective, before
bringing suit in the federal courts3 '
The Chief Justice has recently remarked on the absurdity of
invoking the full panoply of the federal judicial system in a dispute
3 2
regarding a prisoner's right to seven packages of cigarettes.
Exhaustion of speedy and effective state administrative remedies is,
I believe, required by existing law, but I must confess that language
in recent Supreme Court decisions, mostly summary per curiam
reversals, has placed the issue in some doubt. Exhaustion of state
judicial remedies is now required when but only when the prisoner
seeks restoration of good time credits. 33 Going all the way-and
here I am delighted to have Judge Haynsworth's support-would
effect a substantial reduction in the fastest growing head of federal
jurisdiction. This would not happen overnight since the states are
regrettably slow, as they were in the case of postconviction remedies, in doing what they should do, both administratively and
judicially, for the prompt and fair disposition of prisoner complaints. But, as in that instance, they will come to realize the
preferability of handling their own problems if federal law gives
34
them an appropriate incentive.
H. Remove all patent litigationfrom the generalfederal courts and place
it, along with the patent jurisdiction now vested in the Court of
35
Customs and Patent Appeals, in a Patent Court
The case for this is two-fold. One reason is the varying, attitudes of the circuits and, indeed, of judges within a circuit,
toward the basic issue of invention, a-difference now more important than ever in view of the Supreme Court's holding that, broadly
speaking, invalidation of a patent by one circuit invalidates it in
1o See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
31 See FRIENDLY 104-07.
32 See Burger, supra note 22, at 1128.

3 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
a" The subject of the handling of all suits under the Civil Rights Act is now under study
by a committee of the Federal Judicial Center, which will work, so far as concerns prisoner
complaints, in close collaboration with the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Judicial
Conference.
'"

See

FRIENDLY

154-61.
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all. 36 The other is the increased complexity of the subject-matter,
which unduly taxes the ordinary or even the extraordinary judge.
Learned Hand, while still a district judge, referred in the simpler
days of sixty years ago "to the extraordinary condition of the law
which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even
37
the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these.
The proposed Patent Court would meet the latter problem by
having a number of commissioners, who would try the cases as the
commissioners of the Court of Claims do today, and a consulting
scientific staff available both to the commissioners and to the
judges.
I. Place all appellatejurisdiction in federal tax cases in a Court of Tax
Appeals, subject to Supreme Court review only in the exceedingly rare
38
case where a substantial constitutional issue is raised
The most compelling argument for this long advocated reform
is to reduce the great lapse of time now required to procure a final
resolution of disputed issues of tax law. Here, as with most of my
proposals, the change would be needed even if the courts of
appeals were lolling in indolence; its effect of lessening burdens
upon them and on the Supreme Court is a valuable by-product.

J. Make orders of the National Labor Relations Board self-enforcing3 9
Significant relief would be given the courts of appeals by
making orders of the National Labor Relations Board self36 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971) (determination of patent invalidity entitled to collateral estoppel effect in
inter-patent infringement suit in another circuit).
'7 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd
with modifications, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (patent for adrenalin). I could have echoed that
sentiment in Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973) (patent for meprobamate); losing counsel almost certainly did.
"I See FRIENDLY 161-68. I also favor removing federal tax litigation from the Court of
Claims and the district courts and placing all of it in a Tax Court having article III status (id.
at 168-71), but this is more controversial and less urgent.
39 Currently, the National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970),
requires the NLRB to petition a court of appeals to enforce an NLRB order.
Another reform which I would advocate but would not have significant numerical
consequences is repeal of the 1961 statute (75 Stat. 651, now 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1970))
providing for review of final orders of deportation by the courts of appeals, and return of
,initial review of such orders to the district courts. There is always a question whether to place
initial review of administrative action in the district courts or to provide direct access to the
courts of appeals. When review is likely to hinge upon a question of statutory construction,
review by the courts of appeals is obviously preferable. Immigration appeals rarely present
such questions. The issues are rather of fact or of "abuse of discretion," when, indeed, there
are any issues at all and the petition is filed for some purpose other than the usual one of
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enforcing unless the aggrieved party promptly initiates a review
proceeding, a reform that has been recommended on the merits by
the Administrative Conference.4 ° While no one can make a truly
reliable estimate, my judgment is that half of the present seven
hundred cases a year would disappear if the aggrieved party had to
initiate a proceeding instead of simply awaiting action by the Labor
Board. This is no small matter since Labor Board cases normally
comprise nearly half the cases reaching the courts of appeals from
41
tribunals other than the district courts.
In a paper submitted to the Advisory Council on Appellate
Justice, Professors Carrington and Rosenberg have estimated that
the combined effect of these proposals would be to reduce the
filings in the courts of appeals by one-third, 42 bringing us back to
the figures of 1969. 4 3 Although I did not attempt to quantify the
effect of my proposals, I would have thought that, at least in terms
of burden, the reduction would be somewhat higher.4 4 Taking the
professors' estimate and allowing for improved techniques in the
handling of appellate business on the one hand and inevitable
growth on the other, I believe this should see the courts of appeals
through the present century-which is long enough for me. To the
criticism that this in only buying time, I would respond that I
cannot think of anything better to buy, especially when these
reforms are justified on their own merits-provided, and the
proviso is important, that in the time thus purchased we do not
putting off the evil day known to be inevitable. The 1961 statute reflected a belief of the late
Representative Walter of Pennsylvania that direct review by the courts of appeals would
reduce delay. It has not worked out that way, and the statute has created such troublesome
jurisdictional problems (see FRIENDLY 175-76 & n.14) that, as I understand it, consideration
is being given to increasing the burden of the courts of appeals by diverting to them the
immigration cases now handled in the district courts. That would be just the wrong course.
40 See FRIENDLY 174-75.
41 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT, Table B-3 (1973)
42 The professors say

[hereinafter cited as A.O. REP.].
the proposals "would reduce slightly the number of certiorari

petitions filed in the Supreme Court." Since every court of appeals decision is a candidate for
certiorari and petitions for certiorari to the courts of appeals and other federal courts
comprise more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court's certiorari docket, the reduction
should be more than slight.
43 A.O. RP. Table B-33.
41 Elimination of FELA cases, motor vehicle cases, and half of the marine personal
injury cases would reduce the civil docket of the district courts by 13%. FRIENDLY 137. Other
proposals having a large numerical impact are those relating to diversity in general, federal
criminal jurisdiction, collateral attack, and prisoner petitions. While the numerical effect of
the proposals for patent and tax cases would be small, the reduction in burden would be
very significant; a single patent appeal may involve more work than a dozen criminal
appeals.
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simply sit on our haunches but devise new approaches to the
problems that are besetting us.
The professors say that the possibility of adoption of all these
suggestions, even if desirable, is dubious. To this I make two
responses. The first is that the program does not depend on
immediate, or even eventual, adoption of everything. The second is
that we should not too readily despair. If the longshoremen's
unions could be persuaded by improved workmen's compensation
benefits to give up the action against the ship for unseaworthiness,
the railroad and seamen's unions may likewise see that substantial
and quickly obtainable compensation payments are better than the
chance of a larger damage award after many years of delay and
with much of it going to lawyers. No-fault insurance, after some
discouraging jolts, has taken on new life. The obfuscations of the
proponents of diversity jurisdiction cannot forever prevail. At least
the ALI proposal should have a fair chance of enactment if
Congress ever gets the time to consider it, and, with this done,
Congress might well be persuaded to do away with the remnant of
diversity jurisdiction a decade hence. Some ill-advised and widely
publicized federal prosecutions, budgetary considerations, and a
general belief that the federal government has become too big and
intrusive will provide a more favorable climate for reexamining
federal criminal jurisdiction. Limitation of collateral attack on
convictions by legislation specifically directed to that end is clearly
in sight. The states should be acutely interested in this and in
requiring exhaustion of state remedies by prisoners complaining of
the conditions of their confinement, and they are not without
influence in the halls of Congress. There is no longer monolithic
opposition by the patent and tax bars to the creation of specialized
courts. 45 The need is for two things-leadership and congressional
time. With them much can be accomplished; without them nothing
can be. Perhaps I should add a third need-avoiding the distraction of proposals which, however ingenious, do not tackle the
problem at its root.
III
THE PROPOSAL

FOR A NATIONAL

COURT OF APPEALS

It is with that background that I come to Professor
Rosenberg's proposal.4 6 While, as would be expected in light of the

"' See Gausewitz, Toward Patent-ExperiencedJudges, 58 A.B.A.J. 1087 (1972); A Report on
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REv. 327, 354-58 (1972).
41 In light of Professor Rosenberg's generous acknowledgment of the extent of Profes-
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ability of the authors, this contains many sound observations, the
only definite proposal, as I read it, is to consolidate all the existing
federal appellate courts, namely, the eleven circuits, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Court of Claims, 47 which,
with some augmentation in numbers, would continue to perform
their present duties and be authorized to take on some others that
might be delegated to them. The most novel feature of the consolidated court-indeed the only real reason for its creation-is to be a
Central Division, manned by regular circuit judges on a rotating
basis, and having several sections. One would be a Section for
Criminal Appeals "with the duty to grant a searching review in
appeals from the highest court of a state or a federal circuit court
of appeals affirming a criminal judgment," 48 with appropriate
accompanying res judicata effects. A Section for National Law
Specialties would hear cases within specified categories "drawn
from a Chinese-menu style list"'4 9 which Congress prepares but
from which the Supreme Court orders particular categories for the
banquet. Within the selected categories, a decision will start its life
as only a recommended one, but unless the Supreme Court takes
the case within sixty days, the decision will become final and have
the same nationwide authority as Supreme Court decisions now
possess. Another section would examine all petitions for certiorari
and recommend whether the Court should grant or deny them.
Still another section would hear cases, already decided by a federal
circuit court, as to which the Supreme Court "prefers a preliminary
decision to be made by the Central Division and transmitted to the
Supreme Court with a recommendation. ' 50 Along with this Central
Division and a Claims Division and a Customs and Patent Division,
which are the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals under new names, the circuit judges would continue as a "Circuit Division" much as they are now, except that
"they do not perform any functions assigned to the Central
51
Division."
A principal objection to this proposal is the very one the
professors correctly made, in their initial paper, concerning the
sor Paul Carrington's participation, I shall generally refer to this as "the professors' proposal." Somewhat differing versions have been put forward by former Solicitor General
Griswold and a committee of the American Bar Association.
47 Although the Court of Claims is technically a court of first instance, the judges
themselves, as distinguished from the commissioners, function as an appellate court.
48 Rosenberg, PlannedFlexibility To Meet Changing Needs of the FederalAppellate System, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 576, 592 (1974).
49 Id. at 593.
50 Id. at 594.
51 Id. at 592.
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great pother about circuit realignment-namely, that such action
"may persuade some people that the problem has been met and
mastered when in fact it has not. ' 52 The proposal does nothing to
curtail the flow of cases into the district courts, with the single
exception of collateral attacks on state, and possibly federal, criminal convictions. Professor Rosenberg agrees with Justice
Frankfurter's observation that "inflation of the number of district
judges... will result, by its own Gresham's law, in a depreciation of
the judicial currency and the consequent impairment of the prestige and of the efficacy of the federal courts," 5 3 but, doubtless
because of their limited frame of reference, the professors do
nothing about problems that might require a doubling of the
present number of district judges by the end of the decade or, in
any event, within a decade.
It is high time for a more realistic look at the solution of "more
federal judges." The facile assumption that more judgeships are
procurable for the asking has just been proven false. A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has proposed that the
carefully considered recommendation of the Judicial Conference
for fifty-one new district judgeships-itself a considerable reduction of the figures proposed by the circuit councils which, in turn,
were lower than those urged by the district courts-should be cut
to twenty-seven. The basis for this, as I understand it, is that
although these adjustments are made only quadrennially, additional judgeships should be provided solely when a district has
already reached the point of crisis rather than in anticipation of
clearly foreseeable increases in load. 54 Beyond this there has not
been sufficient realization that, at least in the metropolitan centers,
a federal judgeship, on the district court or even on a court of
appeals, is no longer the glittering prize generally conceived. This
is due to the combination of a number of factors: a galloping and
5' The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System appointed to
study this has now soundly recommended that the only things that can usefully be done are
what were obvious all along, namely, splitting the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, although it has
proposed a novel and, in my view, rather unwise method of dividing the Ninth which entails
a division of California. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM,
THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES
OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1973).

53 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).

54 See FRIENDLY 15-27. Although the pending case load in the district courts in 1973
showed the first decline since 1960 (but still to a level higher than 1971), this was due to the
combination of a number of nonrecurring factors, such as the transfer of petty immigration
offenses to federal magistrates and of many criminal and civil cases to the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia. See A.O. REP. 11-14-16. Realistically, save for the District of
Columbia, the burden on the district courts increased. See id. at 11-73.

FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE

1974]

seemingly uncontrollable inflation; the failure of the 1967 salary
legislation 5 5 to cope with this problem as was intended; the increased interest and financial rewards of practice 56 and law teaching, which, indeed, can often be combined; and, most important of
all, the changed consist of federal judicial work, with criminal
matters (including collateral attacks and prisoner petitions) now
accounting for half the filings in the courts of appeals 57 and, very
likely, requiring a still higher proportion of the time of district
judges. There are, of course, some excellent lawyers whose special
interests make them willing to accept a commitment of that size to
criminal business. But they are not likely to have had the experience that will make them expert in corporate, securities, antitrust,
tax, or labor matters, and lawyers with more general interests are
rarely willing to devote half their judicial lives to the affairs of
those charged with or convicted of crime. If the response to what I
have just said should be a question whether good lawyers have
declined nominations to the federal bench, the answer is "yes";
moreover, many fine federal judges have told me, as I am sure they
have told their younger friends at the bar, that they would not have
accepted appointment if they had known what has now become
apparent. One notable resignation for financial reasons has already
occurred; others are understood to be in the offing. Recruitment is
thus already a real problem in the large cities, and a lessening of
prestige by major increases in the number of federal judgeships
would still further decrease the number of highly qualified lawyers
willing to accept appointment to the federal bench.
Beyond this, an increase in the number of filings in the district
courts would be bound to mean a more than corresponding increase in appeals. Figures that have been recently produced are
throwing more light on what has caused an increase in appeals
from 3,889 in fiscal 1960 to 11,662 in fiscal 1970.58 This has not
been so much an increase in the appeal rate, which, though more
than doubling in criminal cases, remained relatively static for civil
cases taken as a whole (although with dramatic contrasts for particular categories), as a doubling of the ratio of appealable civil
81 Stat. 642, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1970).
5 While no one expects governmental salaries to equal those in the private sector, there
is something wrong when a federal judge in New York and other metropolitan centers
receives lower compensation than the most junior partner in the firm whence he came and
little more than twice that paid to beginning lawyers-and less than a clerk of the New York
Court of Appeals.
A.O. REP. Table 5. These reached a new high in 1973. See id.
5

See

DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

ANNUAL REPORT 96 (Table 3) (1971).

OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES

COURTS,
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judgments to total terminations. 59 Even if we should assume that
both these ratios may be leveling off at the present high plateaus,
an assumption that may well be too optimistic, continued increases
in district court filings, not to speak of appeals from the independent agencies and the executive branch, 60 will confront the courts
of appeals with ever mounting case loads.
It is true that the professors' proposal, made to an Advisory
Council on Appellate Justice, is not inconsistent with proposals
designed to limit intake. Indeed, I know from talks with Professor
Rosenberg that he would like to proceed on both fronts. But, as I
said in connection with the Freund Committee report and as the
professors have noted with respect to circuit realignment, we must
avoid diversion of energy. Experience has shown that years are
required to effect reforms in the federal judicial system-often not
so much because they are highly controversial as because Congress
has only a limited amount of time available for such matters and no
high sense of urgency about them. We should therefore look
askance at a proposal which is mainly a reshuffling of appellate
jurisdiction, even if it were more promising than I consider this
one to be, and does not tackle the problem at its source.
Let me begin my criticisms with a few of the less important. I
am not altogether clear how the professors expect the members of
the consolidated court to be appointed, except that they are not to
be appointed to fill specialized roles. This would mean that the
court might not, indeed in the long run very likely would not,
include the specialists who I think are needed to deal with patent
and federal tax cases. Also, while the professors seem not to have
focused on the geographical factor, a hundred important men on
Capitol Hill certainly will. There are established traditions as to
state representation on the courts of appeals other than that for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Presumably, Senators will insist that
state quotas should continue and, indeed, that these should apply
to the full membership of the consolidated court. This could lead
to large-scale bickering on a nationwide level, which would be
repeated each time the membership of the court had to be increased. Also the country would lose the possibility now afforded
by the three national appellate courts for the appointment of
distinguished lawyers or judges who, for one reason or another,
could not become judges in their own circuits.
59 These figures are from an unpublished paper prepared by Jerry Goldman for the
Federal Judicial Center.
60 As to the latter, see FRIENDLY 34-35, and Associated Indus. of New York v.
Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Second, Professor Rosenberg does not tell us how the rotating
judges of the Central Division are to be selected. This is a matter of
considerable moment-indeed, Professor Rosenberg candidly calls
it "crucial"-since some of its sections will be empowered to render
decisions of nationwide effect unless the Supreme Court interposes. But we are told only that it is too early to worry about this
and that the problem "is soluble." 61 Confronted with a similar
problem the Freund Committee could do no better by way of
solution than to devise an automatic plan which would insure that
the judges would represent the average among federal appellate
judges. Bad as that seemed for the task conceived by the Committee, at least its proposed National Court of Appeals, in contrast to
the professors' Central Division, could not decide very much. Yet
any attempt to get the best rather than the average inevitably
entails the question of who makes the selection. I can think of only
two possibilities-the President or the Supreme Court; I don't care
much for either solution.
The professors also shrug off two other problems about rotation of a judge into the Central Division. One is the effect of his
loss on the circuit whence he came. Although this problem is also
said to be "soluble," the only solution that has occurred to me is the
creation of an additional temporary judgeship. A good part of the
term of the departing member on the Central Division might have
passed before the successor was confirmed and had become
thoroughly familiar with the job. Soon the departing brother would
return, with an added member on the court until the temporary
judge died or retired and with the balance of the states thrown off
kilter. Congress should take a very hard look at this.
More serious are the personal and logistical problems created
by a short membership on the Central Division. If the Division sits
in Washington, must the judges move there for the brief period of
their incumbency or are they to come only for arguments and
conferences? Only the former would be efficient. In a review of my
Carpentier lectures Judge Gibbons has noted that
[a] recently completed time study by the judges of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has brought to light that travel time, for
the judges whose duty stations are remote from Philadelphia, is a
very significant part of the real time devoted to the business of
the court. 62
Yet the duty station in the Third Circuit most "remote" from
Philadelphia is Pittsburgh; the Central Division would surely in61
62

See Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 595.
Gibbons, Book Review, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564, 571 (1973).
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clude judges from places much further from Washington
-California, Texas, Florida, perhaps even Alaska and Hawaii. Yet,
as Judge Gibbons also asks, "who would want to relocate his home
and family for a three-year term?" 63 To be sure, this is done by
cabinet and sub-cabinet members and other political appointees,
but there are countervailing factors of prestige or of prospective
advancement in public or private life that would not apply to the
twenty or more judges of the Central Division. Moreover, Professor
Rosenberg seems to contemplate that at least some sections of the
Central Division will ride circuit-a prospect which, although less
horrendous than in the early days of the Republic, is not attractive
as a steady diet even in the jet age. Proposals for central units with
rotating judges must take account of the fact that judges are not
readily movable robots but middle-aged or older men and women,
with spouses, children, friends, and homes.
Taking one more step, I cannot but wonder at the preservation of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals apparently without change. The professors must perceive
some unifying factor in customs and patent appeals that has been
veiled from me. They fail to explain why other anomalies with
respect to the patent appeals now heard by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals6 4 should not be corrected and say nothing
about having all patent appeals heard by a single court. 6 5 Similarly,
the Court of Claims, now named the Claims Division, is left with its
present mixed bag, including a wholly unnecessary and sometimes
harmful tax jurisdiction,6 6 and the professors say nothing with
respect to the long-felt need for a Court of Tax Appeals. 6 7 Although, of course, this could be one of the subjects chosen from
the "Chinese menu" of the Section for National Law Specialties, the
handling of federal tax appeals is a sufficiently important subject to
be faced here and now.
Serious as I think these criticisms to be, they are not the most
important. Let us look at the various sections of the Central
Division, obviously the most significant part of the project.
As already indicated, the Section for Criminal Appeals would
be "charged with the duty to grant a searching review in appeals
from the highest court of a state or a federal circuit court of
63

Id.

" See FRIENDLY 154.

6- Id. at 154-61 (proposing that court hear all patent cases both initially, through
commissioners, and on review).
66 Id. at 163, 170-71.
67 Id. at 161-68.
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appeals affirming a criminal judgment. ' 68 The phrase "searching
review" stems from a paper constituting chapter 6 of the Courts
Section, authored by Professor Meador of the University of Virginia Law School, in the working papers for the National Conference on Criminal Justice held in January 1973, in Washington,
which in turn derived from his study of the British Court of
Criminal Appeals. The stated purpose is "to assure that the
defendant's federally secured rights to counsel, freedom from
illegal search, arrest, line-up, etc., have been protected, 69 whether
previously asserted or not, so that the judgment can have a res
judicata effect not now possessed by affirmances of convictions.
"Searching review" has such a fine ring that questioning it
seems like attacking motherhood. However, the English experience
is not readily transposed to a court whose jurisdiction would
include eleven (probably soon thirteen) circuits and fifty states, and
we had better know what we are doing. In the first place, such a
court would require a large staff to supplement or supplant possibly ineffective defense trial counsel in ferreting out all possible
grounds of attack. One would wish to consider for a long 'time
whether this is desirable and, if so, attainable. The proposal also
seems to run counter to Professor Rosenberg's sound goal of not
elongating the appellate process, since, as I read him, the Section
for Criminal Appeals is interposed between the state courts or the
federal circuit divisions and the Supreme Court. Further, I do not
understand what happens when a federal court of appeals reverses a
conviction. Apparently, the Government must go directly to the
Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court in turn reverses, does the
case go back to the Section for Criminal Appeals for it to investigate possible constitutional infirmities? I do not see the need for all
of this if, as I suggested in discussing Judge Haynsworth's proposal
for a National Court of Criminal Appeals, we are going to achieve
a satisfactory method for dealing with collateral attack as a result of
the work of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Judicial Conference.
Unlike the Section for Criminal Appeals, the Section for National Law Specialties seemingly does not interpose a new appellate
layer. But it has problems of its own. One is the burden on the
Supreme Court of having to decide within sixty days whether to
allow a decision of the section to stand, with nationwide effect, or
to take the case itself. This is a burden quite different from that
68 Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 592.
69

Id.
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incident to certiorari. An ill-advised denial of certiorari to a federal
court of appeals has no serious consequences except to the litigants.
Save in the rare case where the decision was en banc, it does not
even preclude rather ready correction by the particular circuit.
Refusal to take 'on a decision of the Section for National Law
Specialties has the graver consequences of an affirmance; it sets the
law for the country in the same way as a decision by the Court
itself. One of two consequences would follow: either the Court
would have to take a larger proportion of these decisions than it
now does of decisions of courts of appeals in the same area of law,
or the "national law" would be established by a rotating group of
judges without the prestige and, particularly if selected on an
automatic basis, of distinctly less ability than the Justices of the
Supreme Court.
The thrust behind this proposal must be a belief that the
present system involves unacceptable delay in the interpretation of
federal statutes. I believe this to be true with respect to federal
taxation and have proposed a remedy for it. Taxation is the
paradigm of a field where "it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right, ' 70 and the
permanent Court of Tax Appeals I have suggested would be likely
to decide cases in this technical area not only as well as but better
than the Supreme Court. But the need in other areas has not been
demonstrated; and the unwillingness of proponents to indulge in
the modest research that would cast light on the problem arouses
the usual suspicion when no attempt is made to present available
evidence. Doubtless there have been instances where definitive
resolution of an important issue of construction of a regulatory
statute has been delayed for a while; one example was the dispute
among the circuits over the use of union organization cards that
was ultimately decided in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.71 My own

impression was that the Supreme Court failed to resolve that
conflict earlier not because it could not spare the time but because
it wanted the dust to'settle; sometimes this may be as wise with
respect to issues of statutory construction as the professors' initial
paper conceded it to be in constitutional matters. The Court has
found no difficulty in resolving other conflicts under the National
Labor Relations Act 72 and other statutes 73 as soon as they arose.
70

Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-

ing); see FRIENDLY 166-68.
71 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
72 See, e.g., NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 94 S. Ct. 495 (1973); Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
73 See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973)
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The number of cases each term where the Court has reviewed
questions of federal law which have not yet resulted in conflicts
and, in the views of many, were not of great importance suggests
that lack of time is not the reason for delay in conflict resolution.
Moreover, we must not overlook the usefulness of intercircuit
conflicts in focusing the Supreme Court's interest on important
problems of statutory construction. Presumably there would be
relatively little chance to obtain Supreme Court review of a unanimous decision of a specialized court construing a regulatory statute, and even a dissent does not have the same impetus for review
as a conflict. What the Supreme Court cannot resolve is differences
in attitudes by the circuits, and by judges within a circuit, as to the
judgments of administrative agencies acting within their statutory
authority. Although all judges profess deference to the principles
of such review stated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 7 4 in fact
they range from the judge who will "find a way" to upset any
administrative decision he does not approve of to the judge who
will never fault any agency for substantive misuse of conceded
power, with the vast majority at various points between these polar
positions. So long as there are many reviewing panels, no permanent social harm is done, however frustrated a losing litigant may
feel. The situation would be different if there were a single
reviewing court which was either overly zealous or too lax in
applying such vague standards as "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary or capricious."
Then there is a section of judges supposedly acting as super
law clerks who will write memoranda of recommendations to the
Supreme Court with respect to certiorari petitions. I join Judge
Gibbons who, in speaking of the Freund Committee's proposal,
asked, "Who will want the job?"75 Presumably the carrot here is the
prospect of being rotated into one of the other sections, but I
cannot imagine that would suffice, except for the lazy. Both the
Freund Committee and the professors fail to recognize that, whatever the setup, a large proportion of the work on petitions for
certiorari is going to be done by law clerks, either Supreme Court
clerks or other judges' clerks. Indeed, this would be even more the
case with the professors' proposal since I cannot visualize judges
really agonizing over thousands of memoranda of recommendation to
(Shipping Act of 1916); Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (FED. R. Civ. P. 23); Nicholas v.
United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966) (Bankruptcy Act).
74 390 U.S. 474 (1951).
75 Gibbons, supra note 62, at 571.
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the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court clerks will do the work
better both because they will usually have had a year's apprenticeship with a good circuit judge and will be the very best of such
clerks, and, more important, because of their close contacts with
the Justices and the Court's decisional work. A high degree of
reliance on Supreme Court law clerks for screening certiorari
petitions is not at all the evil the description might suggest. I should
suppose a Justice would instruct his clerks to recommend a grant in
several times the number of cases where this can feasibly be done
and would devote the bulk of his "certiorari time" to such cases; the
chance that a worthy case would be missed by nine Supreme Court
clerks must be exceedingly small. In fifteen years as a federal
appellate judge I cannot recall more than a half dozen decisions in
which I participated-if that many-where I thought the Court
had been wrong in denying certiorari; as to those, I am willing to
recognize the Court may have had reasons of which I. was not
aware-or even, although this, of course, comes harder, that it was
right and I was wrong! If present means are inadequate, a better
solution would be to create a small senior staff in the Court 76 which
would come to have a "feel" and a knowledge that rotating circuit
judges and their clerks cannot possibly attain; the best solution of
all might be to persuade three or four Supreme Court law clerks,
already familiar with current problems, to stay on for an additional
year. It is baffling why such splendid minds as the members of the
Freund Committee and Professors Carrington and Rosenberg resist trying simple solutions-even providing Supreme Court law
clerks with secretaries-in favor of complicated ones, except, of
course, that the latter are more fun.77
Finally, we have a section which has been dubbed a "court of
exit" to hear cases the Supreme Court refers to it on an individual
basis as requiring "decision at the highest level, but as to which it
prefers a preliminary decision to be made by the Central Division
11

See FRIENDLY 50-51.
I am not attracted by Professor Kurland's proposal to divide the certiorari-granting
power among all nine Justices, subject to later veto by a vote of five. Apparently denial by a
single Justice would be final. If fractionating is demanded, a better course would be, as
Professor Herbert Wechsler once suggested to me, to have petitions handled in the first
instance by shifting panels of three Justices. One vote should be enough to bring the petition
before the full Court for consideration and three sufficient to grant. Even if an occasional
worthy case fell by the wayside for want of a single vote, the issue would almost certainly
recur. On the other hand, this would not truly be substituting a "rule of three" for the
long-standing "rule of four"; if three out of three Justices favored a grant, the chance that
not one of the other six would be in accord must be exceedingly small.
7
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and transmitted to the Supreme Court with a recommendation.17
Even Professor Rosenberg cannot manage to work up much enthusiasm over this proposal, which he regards as having "only
marginal utility. '7 9 Like the Section on Criminal Appeals, it violates
his goal of not elongating the appellate process. I fail to understand why the judges of this section, particularly if the Central
Division is recruited on a random basis, are better able to make
sound "recommendations" than the judges of the circuit division
who decided the case in the first place. If the professors are again
worried about conflicts, I would think the last place where the
Supreme Court would want another set of recommendations from
circuit judges would be where it already had two. 0
In my view, therefore, the professors' proposal is not a fruitful
line of approach. Flexibility is a desirable quality but not so important as to warrant disruption of long established institutions, elongation of the appellate process in many cases, and distraction of
attention from the true problem. As indicated in my title, there is
only one way to avert the flood, namely, to lessen the flow of cases
into the general federal courts by eliminating those that should not
be there. What we need is not complex institutional change but
legislation that will concentrate all levels of the federal judiciary on
their proper tasks.
78 Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 594.
79 Id.

80 Perhaps the idea behind this proposal is to divert decision about conflicts on subjects

that are not very important. While I do not deny that such cases exist, my impression is that
there are not more than three or four of these each term.

